healthcare system, micromanaging medicine, and generally exposing the nation to the bête noire of socialized medicine. 2 Hyperbole, misrepresentation, and chauvinism aside, 3 these sound bites suffer from a deeper flaw: they mischaracterize the fundamental thrust of the new law. Though the ACA establishes significant new regulatory authority, this is not a new development (indeed it can be faulted for preserving pre-existing regulatory regimes), nor does it impair market competition. To the contrary, much of the law aims at improving conditions conducive to effective competition. With numerous programs designed to correct perverse incentives in the payment system, to mitigate market imperfections, and to make the delivery system responsive to market signals, the ACA might well be rechristened as the "Accommodation of Competition Act."
That said, it is far from clear that market competition will work out as scripted by theorists and proponents of the new law. Myriad market imperfections still complicate market interactions, and regulations need to be carefully tailored to assure effective implementation and to minimize unintended consequences. Of even greater concern are the problematic market structures that pervade provider and payer markets. Concentration, embedded practices, and professional norms may cause markets to operate suboptimally even if reform is implemented smoothly. Finally, the ACA's effectiveness in achieving its goals depends on the executive branch's maintaining a steady hand in countless regulatory determinations. This Article surveys some of the misconceptions about health reform and the challenges proponents confront in realizing their goals.
I HEALTH CARE: REGULATION, DEREGULATION, AND REREGULATION
Regulation in one form or another has long guided the development of health care markets in the United States. In certain respects, government regulation and private self-regulation have worked hand in hand. For many years, a "professional paradigm" prevailed, under which physicians effectively controlled payment systems, health care institutions, and conditions of entry. 4 Physician norms, ethical codes, and rules governing behavior in payment and delivery settings effectively established a system of self-regulation. These institutional and social structures found support in legal regimes that reinforced their authority. For example, laws exempting hospitals from federal and state taxation provided physicians access to free capital and enabled them to exercise control over the operations of those organizations. 5 Licensure, accreditation, and certificate of need (CON) laws reduced supply, limited rivalry, and set terms governing the conditions of competition in the professions and among hospitals. 6 Numerous other laws and conditions of payment have 4 The seminal work on professional dominance is PAUL STARR, THE SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN MEDICINE (1982 1470 (1994) (concluding that the accreditation standards of the Joint Commission on Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations (now called the Joint Commission)-which are given deemed status for hospital certification under Medicare-"institutionalize physician autonomy within hospitals by requiring that the medical staff have an independent organization and structure").
served to cement professional judgments and limit consumers' abilities to make desired trade-offs between costs and benefits. 7 To be sure, legal doctrine has also directly shaped the development of health care organizations and reimbursement. The rapid expansion of hospitals following World War II is in part attributable to the Hill Burton Act, which provided $3.7 billion in funding between 1947 and 1971 for hospital construction and imposed important and longlasting obligations to provide charity care on grant recipients. 8 Perhaps most significantly, in setting the conditions for reimbursement under Medicare and Medicaid, the federal government has exerted significant control over the structure of provider organizations, their internal operations, and the nature and volume of services that are provided. 9 States have wide authority to regulate hospitals under the police power, and they exercise that authority through licensure, which imposes specific operational, clinical, and administrative requirements on practitioners. The era of regulation reached its zenith in 1974 with the National Health Resources Planning and Development Act, which sought to develop standards for controlling the supply, distribution, and organization of health resources, especially acute care hospitals. 10 That law created incentives for states to establish state health planning and development agencies to adopt health-planning strategies and to enact CON laws to assure an appropriate distribution of resources pursuant to the state plan.
11 Although the federal planning law was repealed in 1986, thirty-six states continue to operate CON regulatory schemes that require prior approval for various undertakings, such as new hospital construction or expansion and significant capital investments.
12 During this era, over thirty states also engaged in direct regulation of hospital rates, many using prospective payment methodologies to assert control over explosive growth in costs attributable to fee-for-service payments.
13
Regulation of private insurance has long been the province of the states, which typically exercise control over capitalization, solvency, mandated services and providers, marketing, and claims processing, but states generally do not engage in direct rate regulation. 14 However, federal authority over private insurance has also been exercised on numerous occasions.
The Health Maintenance Organization (HMO) Act of 1973 required employers offering health insurance to include an HMO in the options offered to employees, and it provided subsidies for HMOs that met detailed standards regarding coverage, physician networks, and patient appeals. 15 Over the last twenty years, the federal government has expanded its role, requiring insurers to offer coverage in certain circumstances 16 and placing specific requirements on their handling of information and new technology. 17 Significant legal regimes, including fraud and abuse laws, false claims laws, and the Stark law, emerged as necessary to police abuse arising from the perverse incentives of fee-for-service medicine.
18
Likewise, the prevalence of tax-exempt institutions delivering health care services gave rise to a large body of federal and state law that governs the charitable practices of those institutions and restricts diversion of their assets to private interests. In the 1990s, states responded to perceived abuses and consumer dissatisfaction with managed care by unleashing a new wave of regulations that 13 18 These laws share a common purpose of curbing incentives for providers to bill, refer, and practice medicine in a manner that serves their own interests to the detriment of consumer welfare. See generally FURROW ET AL., supra note 14, at 1023-94.
provided patients rights of appeal and other processes, that mandated coverage of specific services and inclusion of certain providers, and that regulated many other aspects of managed care. 19 The federalstate regulatory borders have frequently been a source of conflict. Significantly, federal law preempts much state regulation that would apply to self-insured employers, essentially creating a dual regulatory system in which state regulation imposes stringent limitations on some plans while others enjoy what has come to be known as a regulatory "vacuum." 20 Thus, regulation of health care providers and payers historically has been something of a roller coaster ride. The era of self-regulation (supported by government deference and facilitating law) lasted until the 1970s when direct intervention became more common. State and federal governments stepped up their efforts to control costs and restrict the supply of health resources, but they never fully supplanted private markets. As dissatisfaction with "command-and-control" regulation grew in the 1980s, what came to be known as the "competitive revolution" began, and antitrust laws helped depose private regulatory regimes while CON statutes and other laws were repealed or fell into disuse. 21 Again, however, this "revolution" never amounted to a coup d'état. Government supervision of providers under Medicare and Medicaid payment policies intensified, and laws necessary to encourage managed care as envisioned by its principal theorists 22 never were adopted. A counterrevolution ensued as public dissatisfaction with managed care and the defeat of the Clinton administration health reforms (which ironically fell victim to perceptions of being overly regulatory but in fact relied heavily on managed care theory) signaled to politicians and insurers that it was time to back off managing care. Numerous laws and judicial interpretations restricted managed care, as a "managed care backlash" imposed regulatory obstacles that impeded the market-based approach to health care.
What messages might be gleaned from the ebb and flow of regulatory activity? The nation has been ambivalent about the role of competition in health care but, at the same time, has resisted command-and-control regulation, at least to the extent that such regulation was apparent to it. While policy makers have broadly endorsed market-based approaches, they have been reluctant to provide the legal infrastructure necessary for effective competition and have cluttered the landscape with a maze of complex and conflicting laws and regulations.
II THE CASE FOR COMPETITION-FOSTERING REGULATION
Justification for regulation to promote competition can be found in virtually every economic analysis of health care. Markets for providing and financing health care are beset with myriad market imperfections: inadequate information, agency, moral hazard, monopoly, and selection in insurance markets that greatly distort markets. Add to that governmental failures-for example, payment systems that reward intensity and volume but not accountability for resources or outcomes, restrictions on referrals that impede efficient cooperation among providers, and entry impediments in the form of licensure and CON-and toss in a strain of professional norms that are highly resistant to marketplace incentives, and you have the root causes of our broken system.
A. Economic Theory: Coping with Market Failure in Health Care
Since Kenneth Arrow's seminal 1963 essay, 23 economic analyses have properly focused on the significant market failures that beset health care markets. Arrow's principal culprits, "uncertainty in the incidence of disease and in the efficacy of treatment," information asymmetries between patient and physician, and the "nonmarketability of the bearing of suitable risks" still collude to prevent optimal resource allocation. 24 Id. at 947 ("The failure of one or more of the competitive preconditions has as its most immediate and obvious consequence a reduction in welfare below that obtainable extent in the severity to which they attach individual failures and the extent to which social institutions may rectify problems, health economists uniformly stress that information, agency, and insurance vastly complicate applying microeconomic principles to analyze the welfare effects of transactions or policy changes. 25 While the causes of market failure may be defined in several ways, 26 four factors appear to have the greatest impact: information deficits, product differentiation, agency relationships, and insurance market imperfections.
First, asymmetries in information and uncertainty as to diagnosis, treatment, and outcome are critical to understanding the health care marketplace. A variety of circumstances undermine the neoclassical assumption that buyers and sellers possess adequate information to assess the quality and costs of the services provided. Because of the technical nature of medical information and the complexity of diagnoses and treatment alternatives, patients and third-party payers find it difficult to evaluate the cost and quality of health services. Indeed, the considerable uncertainty that attends medical treatment makes judgments on causation (and hence costs and benefits of the treatment) difficult. In addition, information is asymmetrically distributed among providers, patients, and payers. This characteristic may permit physicians to induce demand for their services, and at a minimum, it makes information costly for buyers to acquire. 27 from existing resources and technology, in the sense of a failure to reach an optimal state in the sense of Pareto."). 25 A leading text summarizes market failure in health care as follows:
Health markets fail to satisfy the substantial list of requirements that must be met to be classified as perfectly competitive: large numbers of consumers and firms, free entry and exit, marketability of all goods and services including risk, symmetric information with zero search costs, and no increasing returns, externalities, or collusion. While health markets satisfy none of these requirements fully, they fail the requirements of symmetric information, zero search costs, and the marketability of all products most dramatically. Second, product differentiation among physicians and hospitals along a number of dimensions is widely recognized. 28 Hospitals vary widely based on quality, reputation, geographic location, amenities, and other features. Likewise, physicians are differentiated by their training, reputations, locations, hospital affiliation, and many other aspects. On the demand side, the heterogeneous preferences of consumers are manifest, with varying preferences or "tastes" for travel, amenities, reputation, and "caring" service. These preferences interact with heterogeneous product characteristics in health services to contribute to reducing substitutability among providers of essentially the same services. 29 The quality of services sold by health care providers also may vary considerably, depending upon the professionals' talents, training, attention to interpersonal relationships, communication skills, and other factors. Product differentiation that grows out of the heterogeneity of consumer preferences is a source of market power in health services markets. 30 Finally, sellers of health services are subject to impediments to mobility, both in the form of regulatory entry barriers imposed by governmental licensure and private certification and practice requirements and in the form of switching costs, such as those resulting from steep learning curves and changing technology.
Third, agency relationships, which pervade health markets, are highly influential in health care transactions.
31 A large majority of consumers (patients) purchase health care through multiple agents-& Hirschel Kasper eds., 2008) ("[I]f physicians are willing to do more of certain things when paid well to do them, it is hard to see why the idea that physicians might induce demand was ever controversial."). 28 their employers, the plans or insurers chosen by their employers, and the physicians who guide patient choice through referrals and the selection of treatment modalities. For most consumers, choice is limited to a small number of plans; most small employers offer only one plan, and large employers rarely offer more than three. 32 The number of plans and benefits offered by each employer is strongly affected by the possibility of risk selection and the employer's transaction costs in administering health plan coverage. Thus, to some extent, the employer acts as an agent for its employees in purchasing health insurance by choosing plans that afford the mix of quality, price, and geographic coverage that best suits most of its employees. This multiplicity of agents greatly complicates antitrust analyses of consumer behavior and is a principal source of market failure in health care. 33 Health insurance markets also exhibit conditions that give rise to market failures. Moral hazard, for example, refers to the overuse of medical care resulting from the fact that insurance lowers the cost of each purchase for insureds. Overuse causes inefficiency, as insured individuals purchase more services than they would if they had to bear the entire cost; hence, true marginal costs exceed marginal benefits.
34
Risk selection also may undermine health insurance markets. That is, insurers have strong incentives to seek a favorable, or low-risk, pool of insureds. Acting on that incentive can cause an unraveling of risk spreading as the sick and the healthy become divided into different market segments. 35 By the same token, adverse selection may occur as patients switch plans and adjust coverage according to anticipated needs. 32 See Alain Enthoven, Managed Competition of Delivery Systems, 13 J. HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L. 305 (1988) . 33 See Casalino, supra note 31, at 1061-62. Gaynor and Vogt summarize the multiple agent relationship: "In practice hospital choice is a complex combination of the consumer's choice of health plan, the health plan's choice of providers to contract with, the consumer's choice of physician, and the consumer-physician-health plan choice of whether and where to admit the consumer." Gaynor & Vogt, supra note 28, at 1431. 34 
B. Structure and Performance
Turning to the structure and performance of health care markets, one finds additional evidence that conditions precedent for effective competition are lacking and that markets have fallen short of advancing consumer welfare. In short, as I have suggested elsewhere, provider markets evidence the worst of both worlds-hospital and physician markets that are both concentrated and fragmented. 36 Owing in part to several misguided court decisions and the enforcers' seven-year hiatus on challenging hospital mergers, hospital markets have become highly concentrated around the country. By one estimate, ninety-three percent of the nation's 2006 population lived in concentrated hospital markets.
37 Further, abundant evidence shows that consumers have borne the brunt of hospitals' exercise of market power. The Synthesis Project's summary of empirical studies of the effects of hospital consolidation in the 1990s indicates that anticompetitive horizontal mergers raised overall inpatient prices by at least five percent and by forty percent or more when merging hospitals were closely located.
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The causal connection between provider concentration and increasing health care costs finds further support in an important study by the Attorney General of Massachusetts. The report, which closely examined private insurance prices, offers a number of significant conclusions. 39 First, it found that prices paid to hospitals and physicians vary significantly and that higher prices are not associated with quality, complexity, proportion of government patients, or academic status. 40 Second, provider prices in Massachusetts are correlated to market leverage.
41
Hospitals and physician groups with bargaining power extracted higher prices that are not explained by the factors mentioned above. (2010) , available at http://www.mass.gov/Cago/docs/healthcare/final_report_w_cover_appendices_glossary .pdf. 40 Id. at 3. 41 Id. at 7-9.
expensive providers appear to gain market share at the expense of less expensive providers. 42 Fourth, the report concluded that a variety of contractual devices, such as payment parity agreements and product participation provisions, have reinforced and perpetuated pricing disparities. 43 Another study, drawing on site visits by the Center for Studying Health System Change to six California markets in 2008, found that provider leverage has had a "major impact on California premium trends." 44 Interviews in these markets revealed that the bargaining power of hospitals has been enhanced by extensive horizontal consolidation. Consolidation and other factors, such as system bargaining on an all-or-nothing basis, led to a sharp increase in the number of "must have" facilities in the state. 45 In addition, large, multispecialty group practices and independent practice associations also exercise market power by virtue of a lack of price competition for their services. In a remarkable twist, the study found some situations in which the market power of large groups outweighed the advantages for health plans of entering into capitation for insurers. 46 Other, subtler results have also flowed from the wave of consolidations and the marginalization of managed care. Besides price increases owing to enhanced bargaining power, growth in hospital costs appear to have been driven by strategic decisions that take advantage of market imperfections and the absence of effective monitoring by payers. By some accounts, the "medical arms race" has resurfaced.
47
That is, hospitals have undertaken significant expansions in high-margin services and have accelerated technology acquisitions, a phenomenon attributable in part to providers' capacity to induce demand.
Concentrated private-provider markets also impact government payers. Examining the effect of hospital concentration on Medicare payments, the Medicare Payment Advisory Commission (MedPAC) has found that high hospital margins on private-payer patients tend to 42 Id. at 38-40. 43 Id. at 40-43. 44 induce more construction and higher hospital costs and that, "when non-Medicare margins are high, hospitals face less pressure to constrain costs, [and] costs rise." 48 These factors, MedPAC observes, explain the counterintuitive phenomenon that hospital Medicare margins tend to be low in markets in which concentration is highest, while margins are higher in more competitively structured markets. 49 While provider concentration is pervasive, health delivery is also highly fragmented. Primary care practices remain small and isolated with little integration or coordination with specialty physician practices or between physicians and hospitals. 50 Even more damning is the fact that vertical integration is also lacking, or as David Hyman characterized it, "[h]ospitals and physicians occupy separate organizational universes." 51 The case for integrating care across physician specialties and institutions rests on evidence of higher quality of care, opportunities for deployment of evidence-based medicine at the clinical level, and enhanced means of controlling costs by locating responsibility with an organization or team of accountable providers.
52
The payer side has become more concentrated, at least in the individual and small group market, where, according to some data, two firms have greater than fifty percent of the market in twenty-two states, and one firm has more than fifty percent in seventeen states. 53 The results in these markets appear to confirm what economic theory predicts: higher premiums for consumers and high profits for the insurance industry. Summarizing studies indicating that private 48 MEDICARE PAYMENT ADVISORY COMM'N, REPORT TO insurance revenue increased even faster than medical costs, economists John Holahan and Linda Blumberg of the Urban Institute concluded that "the market power of insurers meant that they were not only able to pass on health care costs to purchasers but to increase profitability at the same time." 54 While some other studies conclude that dominant insurers extract monopoly rents, 55 the extent of their exercise of market power has been questioned. 56 Finally, experience suggests that entry into concentrated insurance markets is far from easy and may be unlikely to occur in markets with few insurers. A recent study by the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice found that entry in such insurance markets was impeded by the difficulty of securing provider contracts. 57 The existence of oligopolies or monopolies in both the provider and insurance sectors creates opportunities for anticompetitive mischief. As mentioned earlier, dominant hospital systems and dominant single-specialty physician groups have been able to charge higher prices, which in turn result in higher insurance premiums (and, as some studies show, increased disparities in access to care COMPETITION (2004) . But see Christine A. Varney, Assistant Att'y Gen., Antitrust Div., U.S. Dep't of Justice, Remarks as Prepared for the American Bar Association/American Health Lawyers Association Antitrust and Healthcare Conference (May 24, 2009), available at http://www.justice.gov /atr/public/speeches/258898.pdf (promising "measured enforcement" of the antitrust laws involving the health insurance industry). 57 The Department of Justice's study concluded:
[T]he biggest obstacle to an insurer's entry or expansion in the small-or midsized-employer market is scale. New insurers cannot compete with incumbents for enrollees without provider discounts, but they cannot negotiate for discounts without a large number of enrollees. This circularity problem makes entry risky and difficult, helping to secure the position of existing incumbents.
Varney, supra note 56, at 9.
what happens when dominant insurers face dominant providerswhat economists call bilateral monopoly? The outcome depends on the strategic interactions of the parties. For example, in the now notorious episode involving Partners Health Care and Blue Cross of Massachusetts, the parties reached a mutually beneficial understanding (a "market covenant") to maintain high premiums and high hospital charges. More generally, it appears the dynamics of bargaining may often result in higher prices for consumers. As Holahan and Blumberg summarized industry tendencies: "Dominant insurers do not seem to use their market power to drive hard bargains with providers," but "small insurers do not aggressively compete over price." 58 Holahan and Blumberg noted that "rising premiums and increased profitability of nondominant firms provide indirect evidence of shadow pricing by smaller insurers; that is, smaller insurers do not seem to compete on premiums to gain market share but rather seem to follow the pricing of the dominant insurer."
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In sum, it is hard to ignore the claim that markets as we have known them have not performed well. Whether measured by cost, outcomes, or customer satisfaction, the health care industry's record is one that merits intervention. 60 The following section assays the ACA's prospects for making improvements by introducing regulations that may improve market competiveness.
III THE AFFORDABLE CARE ACT: AN ANTIDOTE TO MARKET IMPERFECTIONS
The ACA's focus on improving competition is illustrated by the steps it takes to establish new markets that facilitate shopping for insurance and to mitigate market imperfections. Though perhaps counterintuitive to those who dichotomize between competition and regulation, law can sometimes foster competition by imposing rules and standards, by mandating purchasing, or by creating competitionfostering institutions. As I have argued since the early days of the 58 HOLAHAN & BLUMBERG, supra note 54, at 3. 59 Id. (footnote omitted). 60 See Len M. Nichols, Director, Health Policy Program, New Am. Found., Statement Before the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, Competition in the Health Care Marketplace 3 (July 16, 2009), available at http://www.newamerica.net /files/NICHOLS_Commerce.pdf (summarizing the costs of noncompetitive pricing, poor quality, and inefficiency in health care and concluding "[i]t is not unreasonable to argue that we pay roughly 2.4 times more than we should for health care").
"competitive revolution" in health care, such regulation is a condition precedent for effective markets.
61

A. Payment and Insurance Reforms
Health insurance exchanges, which serve as the centerpiece of the ACA's attempt to move toward universal coverage, are at bottom markets for offering and purchasing health insurance. Like countless other forums for exchange, such as farmers' markets, stock markets, or online travel services, health insurance exchanges will afford individual consumers and small businesses the opportunity to examine and compare alternative insurance options and to purchase those that best suit their needs. The idea is hardly novel. Its ancestry can be traced to the concept of managed competition, as developed by economist Alain Enthoven and others, 62 and to numerous purchasing cooperatives, health alliances, and connectors-among states and private entities.
63 Past efforts to promote exchanges have floundered, however, primarily because of problems of adverse selection and a resulting inability to attract sufficiently large pools of customers to effectively spread risk. 64 The ACA requires that states establish individual and small group exchanges in each state, 65 and it mandates the purchase of insurance by individuals and encourages employers to purchase insurance for their employees. In doing so, lawmakers 61 See Thomas L. Greaney hoped to create sizeable and stable risk pools that will reduce the risks of adverse selection, that will lower marketing and administrative costs, and that will enable consumers to have sufficient clout bargaining collectively with insurers. In structuring exchanges, the ACA's drafters were fully cognizant of the need to address market imperfections. For example, the law requires that exchanges establish risk-adjustment mechanisms, 66 and it bans discrimination based on age, disability, or expected length of life. 67 Those provisions also serve to lessen the risks of favorable selection problems and to potentially broaden the size of group and non-group insurance pools. In addition, these exchanges can serve to widen choice, improve transparency, and reduce search costs for individuals and employers, thereby enhancing the efficiency of the market.
The ACA also addresses insurance market imperfections through several prohibitions on specific industry practices. 68 For example, it sets rules that govern the terms of insurance policies by prohibiting much medical underwriting and premium pricing based on health status in the small group and non-group markets. 69 These changes are designed to counter the proclivity of insurers to seek out healthy individuals and to mitigate the risk selection phenomenon that impairs insurance market efficiency. In addition, the ACA deals with information deficits in several ways. First, it seeks to increase the amount and accessibility of information by requiring exchanges to perform a variety of functions, such as establishing a toll-free hotline 70 and maintaining a Web site that provides standardized comparative information on health plans 71 and rating plans 72 and that develops enrollee satisfaction surveys. 73 These changes counter welldocumented difficulties encountered in the consumer market regarding the content and quality of health insurance plans. 74 Second, the ACA sets minimum standards for insurance policies in the individual and non-group market by requiring that they cover the "essential benefits package" (to be defined by the Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS)) and that they standardize packages of insurance levels of coverage ("precious metal" plans). 75 In addition, the law imposes a number of limitations on the net amount that cost-sharing plans may require, 76 and it mandates that insurers provide annual rebates to their enrollees if their medical loss ratios (the ratio of amounts incurred for claims and paid for activities to improve health care quality to total premiums) are less than eighty-five percent in the large group market or eighty percent in the small group or individual market.
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These and other measures find support in the necessity of dealing with severe information, agency, and behavioral issues described earlier. In insurance markets, not only are policies complicated and highly heterogeneous, thus making informed comparisons difficult, but also they cause people to rely on unreliable decision aids. As Russell Korobkin has explained, 78 evidence drawn from behavioral psychology demonstrates that consumers have cognitive limitations that can cause them to make decisions in only a "boundedly rational" manner, and they use highly imperfect heuristics and other shortcuts in their decision making. As a consequence, they are likely to fail to 74 ). Health plans offered in the individual and small group markets must cover specific percentages of actuarial value and are arrayed in "precious metal" categories: bronze plans must cover sixty percent of actuarial value, silver plans must cover seventy percent of actuarial value, gold plans must cover eighty percent of actuarial value, and platinum plans must cover ninety percent of actuarial value. Insurers may also offer a catastrophic plan to subscribers under thirty years of age (for a while the plan was referred to as the "young invincibles" plan because it is aimed at attracting younger subscribers inclined to doubt they need health insurance). Id. The actuarial value of services is essentially the net coverage offered by a plan taking into account cost-sharing responsibilities and determined on the basis of the average cost of providing the essential benefits to a standard population, not the actual population of the plan. make individual health insurance purchasing decisions in a way that promotes efficiency. 79 Given intractable difficulties of dealing with certain issues by contract and the absence of other institutional arrangements to assist consumers, legislation mandating coverage may be justified in some circumstances.
For some commentators, the prime culprit distorting markets is the moral hazard associated with health insurance. 80 Moral hazard operates not only in the economic dimension-encouraging overconsumption of services-but also in the regulatory area. Clark Havighurst has persuasively argued that consumers/voters in America are blinded to implications of costly regulations that inhibit insurers from managing care effectively:
[I]gnorance of the cost of care . . . ensures that neither the choices [consumers] make in the marketplace nor the opinions they express in the political process reveal their true preferences. . . .
. . . Even though moral hazard operates with particular vengeance in health insurance, it can be managed to some extent . . . . Inefficiency occurs, however, as soon as government or the legal system barges in to preclude financing intermediaries from effectively managing care-that is, from taking administrative and other actions to limit the impact of moral hazard-or requires them to honor costly entitlements prescribed by law or professional standards rather than set forth in freely negotiated contracts. 81 The ACA attempts to mitigate the moral hazard problem in several ways. First, the so-called "Cadillac Tax 80 See Havighurst, supra note 21, at 78-82.
[I]t should be obvious that the market failure most responsible for economic inefficiency in the health care sector is not consumers' ignorance about the quality of care, but their ignorance of the cost of care, which ensures that neither the choices they make in the marketplace nor the opinions they express in the political process reveal their true preferences.
Id. at 78. 81 Id. at 78-79. 82 The ACA imposes a forty percent excise tax on employment-related health coverage that costs more than $10,200 for individual coverage or $27,500 for family coverage beginning in 2018 subject to various adjustments and exceptions. Although the tax is levied on insurers, it will be passed on to employers and then to employees, and it is thereby likely to result in reduction in the generosity of insurance coverage for plans that exceed the thresholds. See FURROW ET AL., supra note 14.
incentives of employers to provide excessively generous insurance, incentivizes employers to shop more aggressively for plans that are cost-effective, and encourages employees to choose those plans. Indeed the "tax" is really a device to remove a costly and marketdistorting tax benefit. 83 The ACA can be seen as combating moral hazard in other ways as well. Plans offered through exchanges will be structured in a manner that reflects the cost-saving incentives of co-payments and deductibles. Thus, plans in the "precious metal" categories with relatively generous coverage (i.e., lower co-pays and deductibles) will have higher premiums. In addition, although the ACA limits the level of out-of-pocket payments in plans, it sets those limits at the very high levels that current law sets for high-deductible plans under health savings accounts. As a result, high-deductible plans may prove to be popular under the ACA's rules requiring the purchase of health insurance. An individual needs only to select a bronze level plan to avoid the individual mandate penalty and may purchase a catastrophic policy either if under age thirty or if no other plan is available for under eight percent of the individual's household income.
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The ACA takes some steps to address the political aspect of moral hazard identified by Professor Havighurst. For example, the law discourages state mandates of benefits for plans participating in the exchange by requiring that any states that require benefits beyond the essential benefits package required by federal law must pay the additional cost of those benefits for individuals and families receiving federal subsidies. 85 Although such mandates will still apply to plans marketed outside the exchange, this provision is likely to sharply 83 curtail state benefit mandates, as states will likely be unwilling to impose costly mandates that may result in adverse selection and higher costs that will drive consumers away from choosing nonexchange participating plans.
As noted above, government policies, particularly payment methodologies, contribute significantly to the inefficiencies and distortions in the health care system. The ACA undertakes prodigious efforts to redirect federal payment away from fee-for-service payment. With many Medicare beneficiaries having complex health conditions and multiple co-morbidities, most observers agree that this system has significant cost and quality implications; the system provides no incentives for coordination of care, and it tolerates duplicative and costly provision of services. 86 These payment policies have played an important role in encouraging and ossifying a fragmented delivery system. 87 Thus, the ACA requires the Secretary of the HHS to establish, test, and evaluate a five-year pilot program "for integrated care during an episode of care . . . around a hospitalization in order to improve the coordination, quality, and efficiency of health care services." 88 Other reforms, many in the form of pilot programs or demonstrations, similarly attempt to rationalize government reimbursement so as to at least reduce the perverse incentives that have long plagued health care payment and delivery. 89 Finally, the ACA deals with a very significant public goods market failure-the underproduction of research and the inadequate dissemination of information concerning the effectiveness and quality of health care services and procedures. The Act does so by subsidizing research and creating new entities to support such research 90 
B. Delivery System Reform
Considerable scholarship has identified fragmentation in health care delivery as a major source of inefficiency in the health care system. 93 The harms flowing from fragmentation can be observed at the clinical level (inadequate care attributable to lack of provider coordination) 94 and at the administrative level (high administrative and overall costs). 95 The causes of fragmentation are multifaceted and intertwined but aptly summarized by Einer Elhauge:
with identifying effective quality measures and best practices for treatment outcomes); id. The dominant cause of fragmentation . . . appears to be the law, which dictates many of the fragmented features [of the health system] . . . and thus precludes alternative organizational structures. The law is the culprit even though the payment system is also an important cause of health care fragmentation . . . . The reason is that . . . the law dictates that payment system.
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The ACA heeds Elhauge's message by instituting new Medicare programs designed to reward integrated delivery of care. Prominent among these programs is the Medicare "Shared Savings Program," which will make groups of providers who voluntarily meet certain quality criteria eligible to share in the cost savings they achieve for the Medicare program.
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To qualify, these "accountable care organizations" (ACOs) must agree to be accountable for the overall care of a defined group of Medicare beneficiaries, to have sufficient participation of primary care physicians, to have processes that promote evidence-based medicine, to report on quality and costs, and to be capable of coordinating care. Additionally, an ACO must be a group of providers and suppliers that has an established mechanism for joint decision making and may include practitioners (physicians, regardless of specialty; nurse practitioners; physician assistants; and clinical nurse specialists) in group practice arrangements, networks of practices, and partnerships or joint venture arrangements between hospitals and practitioners. The Medicare program will pay the ACOs a global payment for all services needed or, alternatively, share savings based on comparing the ACOs' cost to benchmark payments under traditional Medicare.
The idea, which carries the endorsement of MedPAC and the influential health service researchers at Dartmouth, 98 is not entirely novel. Indeed, if this sounds a lot like the HMO managed care model, 96 that's because it is. 99 In many respects the ACO is the latest in a long line of efforts to develop integrated delivery systems that bear financial responsibility for treatment decisions. Benefiting from the nation's experience with managed care, there are plausible, marketbased reasons for going in this direction. Making entities accountable for care via capitation or global payments mitigates agency and information problems to some extent as providers are given economic incentives to economize care. 100 Further, there is at least modest evidence from the managed care experience that these steps work to moderate cost while continuing to maintain quality of care. 101 But to get there, the new law leaves much detail to the discretion of the Secretary of the HHS, who is presumably informed by experience and learning as the program progresses. For example, the legislation delegates the development of standards for quality, use of evidencebased medicine, and "patient-centeredness" to the HHS. 102 The ACA also seeks to spur competition by adjusting regulatory agency oversight in several areas. For example, the ACA institutes changes to the mechanics of bidding for Medicare Advantage contracts that attempt to move the benchmark bidding process closer to a competitive model. The ACA also expands competitive bidding for medical devices.
interchangeable with previously approved biologics ("follow on" biologics). Although the law was a precompetitive innovation, the law was subject to criticism from the Federal Trade Commission and others that it was unnecessarily protective of intellectual property rights by providing twelve years of market exclusivity to innovator biologics. 104 Finally, a number of proposals designed to foster competition were not enacted. Noticeably absent is the creation of a "public option" insurance plan, a hotly debated reform, which proponents argued would introduce much-needed competition into concentrated insurance markets. 105 However, the ACA gives states various options to create their own new insurance plans and mandates that the Office of Personnel Management contract with insurance carriers to assure that at least two "multistate plans" are offered in every health insurance exchange in each state.
106 Another much-discussed reform, the partial repeal of the McCarran-Ferguson insurance exemption, garnered significant support but was nevertheless excluded in the ACA.
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In sum, those painting health reform legislation as abandoning market-based values in health policy are mistaken. The ACA undertakes enumerable steps designed to eliminate perverse incentives in government payment policies, to encourage development of a scientific and technological infrastructure 104 A Federal Trade Commission report supported legislation that allows follow-on or biosimilar versions of biologic drugs, but it contended that the patent system would provide brand-name products all the protection they need without a period of exclusivity and that allowing for a period of patent exclusivity would be unnecessarily anticompetitive. MICHAEL S. WROBLEWSKI, FED. TRADE COMM'N, EMERGING HEALTH CARE ISSUES: FOLLOW-ON BIOLOGIC DRUG COMPETITION (2009). 105 See Davenport and Sekhar, supra note 53 (discussing the public option plan debate). 106 See infra note 136 and accompanying text. 107 On February 24, 2010, the House of Representatives passed by a margin of 406-18 the Health Insurance Industry Fair Competition Act, repealing in part the McCarranFerguson Act's applicability to health insurers by providing that (1) nothing in the act shall modify, impair, or supersede the operation of any of the antitrust laws with respect to the business of health insurance, and (2) Federal Trade Commission Act prohibitions against using unfair methods of competition shall apply to the business of health insurance without regard to whether such business is carried on for profit. Health Insurance Industry Fair Competition Act, H.R. 4626, 111th Cong. (2010) . A number of observers have argued that, notwithstanding the advisability of repealing the McCarran-Ferguson exemption, it has had little application in health care matters and its importance should not be overstated. See The ACA's capacity to unleash competitive forces to control cost and improve quality of care is contingent on a number of factors. First, much depends on regulations to be promulgated by the HHS and other agencies and the implementation of those regulations by the federal government and the states. Administrative agencies will make a host of determinations crucial to the law's scheme to improve the competitiveness of markets. For example, the Secretary of the HHS is charged with establishing the criteria governing entry into exchange insurance markets. Thus she will set standards for "qualified health plans," ensuring that they adopt appropriate marketing practices, offer a sufficient choice of providers, afford access to essential community providers, and meet numerous other requirements. 108 The Secretary is also required to enhance consumers' opportunity for shopping for plans by developing a rating system that would rate qualified health plans offered through an exchange in each benefits level on the basis of the relative quality and price, 109 and standardizing plans by identifying "essential benefits" that must be offered by each plan.
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States are expected to undertake significant regulation, subject in many cases to regulatory standards set by the HHS. For example, states are responsible for the complex and critical task of developing risk-adjustment programs.
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Significantly, the ACA gives the Secretary of the HHS considerable latitude to exercise her discretion as to the substance, timing, and extent of most of these regulations. . 112 See CURTIS W. COPELAND, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41180, REGULATIONS PURSUANT TO THE PATIENT PROTECTION AND AFFORDABLE CARE ACT (P.L. 111-148) 3 (2010) (describing twenty-six provisions of the ACA mandating "federal agencies to issue regulations that define certain terms, establish substantive requirements, create certain programs, and determine the timing of particular events"; eleven provisions that permit Most of the key regulatory determinations will be made over a period extending to 2014 and beyond and are likely to be the subject of intense political controversy and debate. The inevitably shifting political winds over this extended period of time 113 are likely to influence regulators and legislators as they implement the ACA.
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Political turbulence might well cause regulators to dilute some of the features of the reform bill that are critical to maintaining competitive markets. For example, eliminating or weakening the individual mandate would likely cause severe disruptions in the insurance markets as a result of adverse selection. Inadequate risk-adjustment mechanisms would likely also permit insurance markets to unravel. In addition, indifferent attention to buyers' needs for standardization of choices and useable qualitative information will undermine the efficiency of comparative shopping.
States are also expected to assume significant responsibilities in implementing health reform. 115 For example, state legislative and regulatory actions are needed for setting up the local apparatus for new insurance markets, for implementing Medicaid expansion, 116 and for enforcing the ACA's requirements.
117
Whether the law will such actions; and seven provisions that "appear to contemplate" such actions); see also (2010) . 117 Professor Elizabeth Weeks Leonard aptly summarized the allocation of responsibility: "the Exchanges impose massive financial, administrative, and enforcement burdens on states to operate the new individual and small-group health insurance marketplace and coordinate with other specific ACA components." Elizabeth Weeks succeed in inducing "cooperative federalism"-partnership between federal and state governments to implement the new law-is a matter of serious question.
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Given the strength of the "health reform nullification movement" 119 and efforts to get courts to overturn vital provisions of the new law, 120 there is a real possibility that some states may undertake half-hearted implementation efforts, provide limited funding, and make only lackadaisical enforcement efforts.
On the other side of the coin is the real risk that reform will produce what Professor Havighurst has called in another context "hyper-regulation" of health insurance markets. 121 That is, the farreaching regulatory provisions of the ACA might result in a regulatory regime that distorts markets through "excessive" consumer safeguards or that undermines the ability of payers and providers to offer alternatives that appeal to different consumer groups.
122 For example, regulating network adequacy, specifying conditions of programs (e.g., "patient-centeredness" 123 ), and dictating other terms 122 See id. at 84 (arguing that "the dynamics of the political market for consumerprotection regulation provide strong reasons to believe not only that standard-setting, command-and-control regulation systematically generates more social costs than benefits, but also that those costs are most likely to fall disproportionately on persons with lower incomes"). of private insurance may unduly limit choice, unfairly burdening lowincome groups with expenditures they may not otherwise choose to make. As some have argued, preserving choice within limits along the dimensions of quality, convenience, and cost provides the raison d'être for maintaining a private system of health care financing. 124 Finally, one can safely predict that the ACA will give rise to unintended consequences (though identifying them is not so easy).
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A key challenge for regulators will be to refrain from overprotective denials and to respond quickly to make necessary changes. However, when legislation is needed, 126 politics may intrude, and opponents may prefer to allow the statute's flawed provisions to remain in effect rather than fix what they regard as a wholly wrongheaded and unconstitutional enterprise.
B. Concentrated Markets and Entry Barriers
The high levels of concentration in hospital, specialty physician, and payer markets pose a serious problem for implementing reforms that rely on competition. As described above, the ACA relies on two important innovations to promote competition. First, it creates exchanges that will afford opportunities for comparative shopping by consumers and competition among health plans. Second, it supports development of new delivery systems, such as ACOs and medical homes, that can integrate care and take responsibility for managing care under budgetary constraints. Uncompetitive provider and payer markets may imperil both initiatives.
Achieving cost savings from competition among payers requires provider market competition. health costs are well documented, 127 and there is little in the reform legislation designed to change things. While returning insurers to the role of managing care can help mitigate the myriad market imperfections that complicate health care markets, it remains to be seen how effective regulations improving transparency, promoting evidence-based medicine, and curtailing insurance industry practices will be. Further, enforcement of antitrust law offers no panacea for the problems sketched above. Antitrust does not break up legally acquired monopolies or oligopolies, nor does it counter their exercise of market power through monopoly pricing, output restrictions, or quality degradation. Thus, to a considerable extent, the horse is out of the barn as far as consolidation in physician, hospital, and insurance markets that has already occurred.
To some commentators, embedded provider market concentration is an intractable problem that can be cured only by rate regulation. 128 An alternative approach recommends blending reliance on markets with steps to improve competition when possible and falling back on rate regulation when possible. For example, Len Nichols has framed this approach as follows:
When prices are stuck far from the efficient cost level, policy makers have three basic tools at their disposal:
(1) Change rules related to market entry and structure to engender more market competition (e.g., antitrust)
(2) Use countervailing market buying power (monopsony) to counter local provider market power and resistance to change (3) Impose direct regulation of prices or specific behaviors of competitors.
129 127 See supra notes 38-46 and accompanying text. 128 See, e.g., Berenson et al., supra note 47.
Unless market mechanisms can be found to discipline providers' use of their growing market power, it seems inevitable that policy makers will need to turn to regulatory approaches, such as putting price caps on negotiated private-sector rates and adopting all-payer rate setting. Indeed, some purchasers who believe strongly in the long-term merits of increased integration of care delivery believe that price regulation may be a prerequisite for payment reforms that encourage integration. Nichols's proposal merits consideration. However, given the difficulties associated with parts (1) and (2) of his concept, much of the burden may fall on item (3), rate regulation. Regulators and enforcers can take steps to encourage new entry; however, their tools are limited. While collusion to inhibit entry is actionable under antitrust law, 130 CON laws, laws governing the scope of practice for allied health practitioners, and other regulatory limitations on provider competition are the product of state and federal law. The ACA made no efforts to alter these limitations, and it is doubtful there is political will to do so. Indeed, the ACA all but put an end to one source of new competition in hospital markets by banning new physician-owned hospitals that depend on Medicare reimbursement. 131 Reliance on countervailing power is also open to question. As a matter of economic theory 132 and experience, 133 bilateral monopoly does not necessarily advance consumer welfare. Moreover, identifying the conditions in which bilateral monopoly should be encouraged (e.g., by countenancing otherwise anticompetitive mergers) is fraught with uncertainty. The structure of insurance markets also poses an obstacle to reliance on competition. With one insurer controlling more than fifty percent of the market in seventeen states and at least twenty-two others states having two firms that dominate the market, 134 much attention during the reform debate focused on improving the competitiveness of insurance markets. Advocates claimed that offering a government-sponsored public plan option in each market would improve the dynamics of private plan competition in local and regional markets. The competition-based argument for the public option rested on the dynamics of rivalry in concentrated markets. When insurers were unable or unwilling to effectively bargain for discounts with hospitals, 135 the public plan would act as a "maverick" because it did not have incentives to go along with rivals that might be content to compete less vigorously.
Id
While the foregoing arguments did not carry the day, Congress did adopt two proposals ostensibly designed to inject new competition into private insurance markets. The ACA authorizes the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) to enter into contracts with "multistate insurance plans" to offer individual or small group coverage through the exchanges. 136 It requires the OPM to contract with at least two plans in each state, at least one of which must be a nonprofit.
137 Second, the ACA authorizes federal grants and loans to encourage the creation of nonprofit, member-owned consumer insurance cooperatives.
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Cooperatives will be tax exempt, nongovernment entities, but they will be subject to a number of 134 See Davenport and Sekhar, supra note 53. 135 John Holahan explained the dynamic of hospital-payer bargaining as follows:
In markets where there is little concentration among insurers but a concentrated hospital market, there is little ability to negotiate. Where there is a dominant insurer, it is possible to do better and obtain discounts from hospitals, but they still have little negotiating power with dominant hospital systems. In some markets, dominant insurers have no real incentive to be tough negotiators because they have no real competitors. Small insurers lack bargaining power with providers and thus cannot significantly compete with larger insurers on premiums. Finally, there is no real competition in many hospital markets because smaller hospitals have no ability to challenge the dominant system. . 137 The ACA empowers the Office of Personnel Management to negotiate with the plans concerning their medical loss ratio, profit margin, premium levels, and other terms and conditions as are in the interests of the enrollees. Id. regulatory restrictions. The problem that both cooperative and multistate plans encounter is the obstacle that has stymied new entrants in the past: the entry barrier associated with obtaining provider discounts and assembling networks that will enable new plans to compete effectively with established incumbents. ACOs have garnered much attention. 140 For many observers they hold out the prospect of rationalizing the delivery system by incentivizing providers to integrate their practices, make investments in technology and human capital, and ultimately change the way medicine is practiced. Under this Panglossian account, ACOs can provide a vehicle for lowering cost and improving quality, not only in Medicare but in the private sector as well. To meet the organizational and practical requirements of the ACA, providers will need to combine through merger or some other form of affiliation and make lasting commitments regarding their participation. There are already anecdotal reports of a pending merger and acquisition wave prompted by hospitals and physicians that want to position themselves to form ACOs, 141 even though, as of this writing, the HHS has yet to release rules or guidance.
From the perspective of the topic of this Article, a key issue is whether the movement to form ACOs will advance the competitive model or retard it. To a considerable extent, ACOs mirror the procompetitive potential that HMOs brought to the table during the managed care era. That is, the ACO can serve as a locus of responsibility, accountable for maintaining quality and using evidence-based medicine and operating under financial incentives to control costs. As such, employers and insurers will be able to shop, compare, and bargain with ACOs to get the best deal for their insureds. Indeed, because they assume risk, ACOs can reduce the role of the insurer/middleman, offering presumed benefits to both providers and consumers who are suspicious of the insurance industry. But at the same time, the path of ACO development could prove profoundly anticompetitive. One concern flows from what might come to be called the "2010 Health Reform Merger Wave"-a rush to consolidation induced in part by hospitals and physicians wanting to be assured they will be in a strong bargaining position. 142 As hospitals buy up or otherwise affiliate with physician practices, as physician practices merge, and as hospitals merge with rivals, there may be little room for formation of competing ACOs in many markets. Whether the HHS will use its regulatory authority to discourage over-inclusive ACOs is still an open question. 143 Although the ACA contemplated that Medicare ACOs also serve the private insurance industry, 144 it gave no guidance as to whether the HHS should attempt to preserve conditions that are conducive to competition among ACOs. Thus, although ACOs are potentially the most potent mechanism for systemic change in the new law, Congress neglected to specifically charge the HHS with the responsibility for assuring that the Shared Savings Program does not enhance or entrench provider market power.
